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ABSTRACT
This article provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of terrorism at the country level.
In contrast with the previous literature on this subject, which focuses on transnational terrorism only,
I use a new measure of terrorism that encompasses both domestic and transnational terrorism. In line
with the results of some recent studies, this article shows that terrorist risk is not significantly higher
for poorer countries, once the effects of other country-specific characteristics such as the level of
political freedom are taken into account. Political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does
so in a non-monotonic way: countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to
be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with
highly authoritarian regimes. This result suggests that, as experienced recently in Iraq and previously
in Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied
by temporary increases in terrorism. Finally, the results suggest that geographic factors are important
to sustain terrorist activities.
Alberto Abadie





After the 9/11 attacks, much of the political and media debate on terrorism has focused
on prevention policies. The widespread view that poverty creates terrorism has dominated
much of this debate (see, for example, Kahn and Weiner, 2002). This is hardly surprising.
After all, the notion that poverty generates terrorism is consistent with the results of most
of the existing literature on the economics of con°icts. In particular, the results in Alesina
et al (1996) suggest that poor economic conditions increase the probability of political
coups. Collier and Hoe®er (2004) show that economic variables are powerful predictors of
civil war, while political variables have low explanatory power. Miguel, Satyanath, and
Sergenti (2004) show that, for a sample of African countries, negative exogenous shocks in
economic growth increase the likelihood of civil con°ict. Because terrorism is a manifesta-
tion of political con°ict, these results seem to indicate that poverty and adverse economic
conditions may play an important role explaining terrorism.
However, recent empirical studies have challenged the view that poverty creates terror-
ism. Using U.S. State Department data on transnational terrorist attacks, Krueger and
Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) ¯nd no evidence suggesting that poverty may generate ter-
rorism. In particular, the results in Krueger and Laitin (2003) suggest that among countries
with similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich
countries. Conversely, among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, richer countries
seem to be preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks.1
While the results in Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) are extremely sug-
gestive, these studies may su®er, in principle, from some potential shortcomings. First of
all, the U.S. State Department data covers only events of international terrorism, that is,
those that involve citizens or property of more than one country. However, international
terrorism represents only a small fraction of terrorist activity. For example, for the year
2003, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base reports 1,536 events of domestic terrorism,
1In addition, for the Israeli-Palestinian con°ict Krueger and Male^ ckov¶ a (2003) show that participants
in politically motivated violence tend to originate, if anywhere, from relatively a²uent sectors of the
population.
1but only 240 events of international terrorism.2 The di®erence between reported domes-
tic and international terrorist events in the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base is large, in
spite of the probable fact that international terrorist incidents tend to have more visibility.
While it is clearly interesting to elucidate the impact of potential policy interventions on
the level of international terrorism, the e®ects of such policies on the overall amount of
terrorism, both domestic and of foreign origin is of obvious importance too. However, the
identity of the determinants of international terrorism is not necessarily informative about
the identity of the determinants of domestic terrorism. Much of modern-day transnational
terrorism seems to generate from grievances against rich countries. In addition, in some
cases terrorist groups may decide to attack property or nationals of rich countries in order
to gain international publicity. As a result, transnational terrorism may predominantly
a®ect rich countries. The same is not necessarily true for domestic terrorism.3 Second,
the adequacy of the U.S. State Department data to measure terrorism has been recently
under attack. Krueger and Laitin (2004) have questioned the quality of this dataset on the
basis of the ambiguity of the de¯nitions used for the variables in the dataset and the lack
of transparency of the process through which this dataset is assembled.4 Finally, because
terrorism may in turn a®ect economic prosperity (see, e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2004; Sandler and Enders, 2005) the observed correlation
between terrorism and national income cannot be interpreted as a measure of the magni-
tude of the e®ect of economic variables on terrorism. Because terrorism adversely a®ects
economic prosperity, ordinary regression estimates of the e®ect of economic development
on terrorism are biased downwards. Therefore, the estimates in Krueger and Laitin (2003)
and Piazza (2004) can be interpreted as a lower bound on the e®ect of economic prosperity
on terrorism. The magnitude of that e®ect is not identi¯ed in an ordinary regression.5
2See MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2004.
3Sandler (2003) describes the di®erences in terms of motivation and targets between international and
domestic terrorism.
4Subsequently, Secretary Powell admitted errors and omissions in the construction of the State Depart-
ment terrorism data. See Eggen (2004).
5See also Alesina et al (1996) for a discussion and treatment of the problem of simultaneous causation
between economic growth and political instability.
2As in the Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2003) articles mentioned above, most
studies on the causes and e®ects of terrorism have relied on measures of terrorist casualties
or terrorist incidents as proxies for the level of terrorist risk. Frey (2004) and others have re-
cently questioned the quality and adequacy of the available data on terrorist casualties and
incidents. In this article, I use a new dataset on the intensity of country-level terrorist risk
to study the linkages between terrorism and economic and political variables. The measure
of terrorism intensity used in this article comes from country-level ratings on terrorist risk
from an international risk rating agency. Risk ratings are used by international investors
to evaluate speci¯c types of country risks. Terrorist risk ratings have obvious limitations.
They provide only a summary measure of an intrinsically complex phenomenon. However,
they have the advantage of re°ecting directly the total amount of terrorist risk for every
country in the world. To my knowledge, this article represents the ¯rst attempt to measure
the determinants of terrorism using risk rating data.
The analysis of risk rating data presented in this article validates the ¯ndings in Krueger
and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) and produces a number of new results. The empirical
results reported below show that terrorist risk is not signi¯cantly higher for poorer coun-
tries, once the e®ects of other country-speci¯c characteristics such as the level of political
freedom are taken into account. In contrast with the results for civil wars in Collier and
Hoe²er (2004), lack of political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, and it does so in a
non-monotonic way. Countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to
be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries
with highly authoritarian regimes. This result suggests that, as experienced recently in
Iraq and previously in Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a
democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism.6 Finally, the results
of this article suggest that geographic factors may be important to sustain terrorism. In
particular, variables which measure average elevation, tropical weather, and country area
6In Spain, for example, the number of deaths caused by terrorism increased sharply in the late 1970's,
with the beginning of the democratic transition, and decreased gradually afterwards. See Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003).
3are powerful predictors of terrorism. The results obtained using ordinary regression become
even sharper when instrumental variables methods are used to correct for reverse causation.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section ii describes the data. The
results of the empirical analysis are reported in Section iii. Section iv summarizes the
main conclusions of the article.
ii. Data
Table I contains de¯nitions of the variables in the dataset and descriptive statistics. The
measure of terrorist risk that I use in this article is the World Market Research Center's
Global Terrorism Index (WMRC-GTI). The WMRC-GTI seems to be the ¯rst attempt
to measure globally the risk from terrorist attacks at a country level. The WMRC-GTI
assesses the risk of terrorism in 186 countries and against these countries' interests abroad
for the period 2003/4. The WMRC-GTI encompasses ¯ve factors forecasting motivation,
presence, scale, e±cacy and prevention of terrorism. The potential range of the WMRC-
GTI is 1-100 with higher values representing higher exposure to terrorism.7
To measure poverty I use data on country GDP per capita, which comes from World
Bank (2004a). In some regressions, instead of GDP per capita, I use the United Nations
Human Development Index or the country Gini Index. The Human Development Index
measures the well-being of the inhabitants of a country along three di®erent dimensions:
health, education, and income. It is constructed using country data on life expectancy
at birth, adult literacy and school enrollment ratio, and GDP per capita. The Human
Development Index has a 0-1 potential range. The Gini Index is a widely-used measure of
income or consumption inequality. The potential range of the Gini Index is 0-100, a value
of zero meaning perfect equality. Data on the Human Development Index and the Gini
Index come from United Nations (2004).
The measure of (absence of) political freedom is the Freedom House's Political Rights
Index (Freedom House, 2004). In contrast with Krueger and Laitin (2003), I use a measure
of political rights rather than a measure of civil liberties to describe the political climate
7See World Market Research Center (2003) for further information.
4of a country. The reason is that endogeneity may be a more serious concern for the latter,
if countries restrict civil liberties in response to terrorism. However, given that these two
variables are highly colinear, the results of the empirical section do not depend on which
one is used in the regressions. The Freedom House's Political Rights Index has a 1-7 range,
with high values representing absence of political rights.
Indices for linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization come from Alesina et al
(2003). These indices range between zero and one; they re°ect the probability that two
individuals chosen at random from the same country belong to di®erent linguistic, ethnic,
or religious groups.
Finally, data on geography and climate come from Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs (2001).
Geographic variables include measures of country land area, average elevation, fraction of
the country area in tropical climate, and landlock.
iii. Empirical Results
A. OLS Regressions
In this section, I use country-level data for the period 2003-2004 to estimate the following
basic speci¯cation.
ln(terrorist risk) = ® + ¯ ln(GDP per capita) + X
0° + ": (1)
As explained above, I use the WMRC Global Terrorism Index to measure terrorist risk at
the country level. The vector X includes other potential predictors of terrorism such as
measures of political freedom, fractionalization, and country geography and climate.
Table II, in columns (1)-(6), reports Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the
coe±cients in equation (1).8 The coe±cient on log GDP per capita in column (1) shows
that a 1% increase in per capita GDP is associated in the data with a .17% reduction in
terrorism, as measured by the WMRC Global Terrorism Index. Columns (2) and (3) show
that this negative association decreases but remains signi¯cant when the Freedom House's
8Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All speci¯cations include regional
dummies. See table notes for details.
5Index of Political Rights is introduced in the regression. The e®ect of political freedom on
terrorism is signi¯cantly non-linear in column (3).
In column (4), I include in the regression measures of linguistic, ethnic, and religious
fractionalization. Only the measure of linguistic fractionalization shows a signi¯cant as-
sociation with terrorism: conditional on income, political freedom, and linguistic frac-
tionalization, ethnic and religious fractionalization are not signi¯cantly associated with
terrorist risk. The association between linguistic fractionalization and terrorism becomes
even clearer when the other non-signi¯cant fractionalization measures are excluded from
the regression in column (5). In columns (4) and (5), where fractionalization indices are
included in the regression, the coe±cient of log GDP per capita remains negative but it
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional test levels.
It is well-known that certain geographic characteristics may favor terrorist activities.
First of all, areas of di±cult access o®er safe haven to terrorist groups, facilitate training,
and provide funding through other illegal activities, like the production and tra±cking
of cocaine and opiates. Failure to eradicate terrorism in some areas of the world has of-
ten been attributed to geographic barriers, like mountainous terrain (e.g., Afghanistan) or
tropical jungle (e.g., Colombia). In addition, large countries tend to generate centrifugal
pressures, include disa®ected minorities, and accumulate grievances.9 To control for the
e®ect of geographic factors on terrorism, I include in column (6) three additional variables
in the regression: total country area, average elevation, and proportion of the country area
in tropical weather. Because geographic factors are also believed to a®ect economic devel-
opment (see, for example Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1998), it is potentially important to
correct for the confounding e®ect of these variables. Once geographic factors are included
in the regression, the coe±cient on per capita GDP decreases below its standard error, in
absolute value.
To sum up, the regression results in columns (1) to (6) show that after controlling for
other country characteristics, including the level of political rights, fractionalization, and
9See also Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe®er (2004) for a discussion of how certain
geographic characteristic may favor civil wars.
6geography, national income is not signi¯cantly associated with terrorism.10
Columns (7) and (8) report the coe±cients for the same regression as in column (6), but
this time using the U.N. Human Development Index and the Gini Index, respectively, as
explanatory variables instead of log per capita GDP. The results show again that once other
country characteristics are included in the regression, human development and inequality
do not show a signi¯cant correlation with terrorism, at conventional test levels.
B. IV Regressions
The regression results in the previous section describe correlations between terrorism and
other country characteristics, such as economic factors. It would be erroneous, however, to
interpret those correlations as measures of the e®ect of economic variables on terrorism. Of
course, the reason is that not only economic factors may cause terrorism, but also terrorism
may a®ect economic prosperity.
In this section, I use variation in country income induced by geographic landlock to
estimate the e®ect of country income on terrorism. Landlock (the fraction of a country
area distant to sea access) has been shown to predict economic growth (see Gallup, Sachs,
and Mellinger, 2001). The identi¯cation assumption adopted in this section is that landlock
does not cause terrorism directly; that is, landlock is only related to terrorism through its
e®ect on national income. If this assumption holds, variation in national income induced by
country landlock can be treated as exogenous and used to assess the e®ect of an exogenous
change in income on terrorism level.
Table III, in columns (1)-(6), reports instrumental variables estimates of the e®ect of
national income on terrorism. Qualitative results remain virtually unchanged relative to
10Besides the results reported here, I estimated additional speci¯cations which included measures of
other potential determinants of terrorism. In particular, following Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier
and Hoe®er (2004) work on civil con°icts, I included explanatory variables measuring education and the
proportion of young males in the population. Collier and Hoe®er (2004) argue that education may a®ect
political attitudes and increase the opportunity cost of political violence. Fearon and Laitin (2003) hy-
pothesize that young males may be particularly apt or inclined to engage in political violence. The speci¯c
measures that I employed were the average years of schooling for adults (World Bank, 2004b) and the pro-
portion of males aged 15-24 in the population (United Nations, 2003). None of these variables produced
signi¯cant coe±cients at conventional test levels.
7Table II. However, the magnitude of some of the coe±cients change considerably. In con-
trast with the results in Table II, the instrumental variables coe±cient on log per capita
GDP becomes positive in columns (4)-(6) where the fractionalization and geographic vari-
ables are included in the regression. Nevertheless, this coe±cient remains non-signi¯cant
at conventional test levels. In addition, the magnitude of the coe±cients on the political
freedom variables increases considerably. The results in column (6) show that the e®ect of
political variables is signi¯cantly non-linear once the e®ect of geographic factors is taken
into account.11
Figure 1 plots the estimated e®ect of lack of political rights on terrorism with the other
variables evaluated at their means. Over most of the range of the political rights index,
lower levels of political rights are associated with higher levels of terrorism. However, highly
authoritarian countries (political rights index equal to 7) experience lower terrorist risk than
countries in some intermediate range of political rights (political rights index equal to 4-6).
The non-monotonic nature of the relationship between political rights and terrorism can be
interpreted in di®erent ways. On the one hand, the repressive practices commonly adopted
by autocratic regimes to eliminate political dissent may help keeping terrorism at bay.12
On the other hand, intermediate levels of political freedom are often experienced during
times of political transitions, when governments are weak, political instability is elevated,
so conditions are favorable for the appearance of terrorism.13
As with the OLS regression results in the previous table, column (7) reports the esti-
mated coe±cients for a speci¯cation that uses the U.N. Human Development Index, instead
of per capita income, as an explanatory variable. The U.N. Human Development Index is
instrumented also with landlock.14 Similar to the results in the previous column, the instru-
11Similar to the OLS results, measures of education and of the proportion of young males in the popu-
lation did not produce signi¯cant coe±cients.
12The country with the lowest value of the WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/4 is North Korea, a
highly autocratic regime.
13See Fearon and Laitin (2003) for a discussion of the same issues in relation to civil wars.
14Table III does not include a speci¯cation with the Gini Index treated as an endogenous explanatory
variable. Arguably, country inequality is a®ected to a lesser extent by reverse causation than per capita
GDP or human development. In addition, while landlock is believed to a®ect per capita income and human
development, to my knowledge a similar e®ect has not been documented for inequality. In fact, while the
landlock variable produces decent ¯rst stages for per capita income and human development (with ¯rst-
8mental variables coe±cient of the human development index is positive but not statistically
di®erent from zero at conventional test levels.
iv. Summary and Conclusions
Using a new dataset on terrorist risk worldwide, I fail to ¯nd a signi¯cant association be-
tween terrorism and economic variables such as income once the e®ect of other country
characteristics is taken into account. Instrumental variables estimates, which are used to
correct for reverse causation, produce the same qualitative results. The estimates sug-
gest, however, that political freedom has a non-monotonic e®ect on terrorism. This result
is consistent with the observed increase in terrorism for countries in transition from au-
thoritarian regimes to democracies. In addition, the results show that certain geographic
characteristics may favor the presence of terrorism.
stage F-statistics on the excluded instrument of 6.47 and 11.39 in columns (6) and (7), respectively), the
same is not true for inequality. The ¯rst-stage F-statistic on landlock with the Gini Index as the endogenous
explanatory variable is just 1.22.
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12Table II { Terrorism and Country Characteristics
(OLS with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors)
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic variables:
log GDP per capita -.1680¤¤ -.1263¤¤ -.0948¤¤ -.0511 -.0642 -.0400
(.0343) (.0410) (.0434) (.0464) (.0448) (.0492)





lack of political rights .0563¤¤ .2966¤¤ .2289¤¤ .2469¤¤ .1975¤ .2535¤¤ .2330¤¤
(.0274) (.1073) (.1141) (.1110) (.1136) (.1118) (.1090)
lack of political rights squared -.0300¤¤ -.0212 -.0236¤ -.0198 -.0272¤¤ -.0262¤
(.0127) (.0133) (.0130) (.0132) (.0130) (.0135)
Fractionalization:
linguistic .4207¤ .5122¤¤ .3565¤ .3164¤ .4016¤¤






country area .0449¤¤ .0459¤¤ .0428¤¤
(.0130) (.0121) (.01417)
elevation .0150¤¤ .0198¤¤ .0208¤¤
(.0060) (.0061) (.0061)
tropical area (fraction) .3119¤¤ .3063¤¤ .3778¤¤
(.1135) (.1141) (.1256)
R-squared .21 .24 .27 .32 .32 .37 .33 .43
Number of observations 156 154 154 144 146 136 146 118
Notes: All speci¯cations include an exhaustive set of regional dummies for North America and Western Europe, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and
Rest of Asia and Paci¯c. Heteroskedascity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
¤ indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
¤¤ indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
13Table III { Terrorism and Country Characteristics
(IV with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors)
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Economic variables:
log GDP per capita -.2167 -.1372 -.1175 .0633 .0564 .1995
(.1518) (.2005) (.2167) (.2213) (.2125) (.1913)
human development index 1.2714
(1.5889)
Political variables:
lack of political rights .0426 .2409 .3881 .4009 .4676¤¤ .3937¤¤
(.0660) (.2876) (.2583) (.2637) (.2234) (.1812)
lack of political rights squared -.0244 -.0375 -.0393 -.0461¤¤ -.0417¤¤
(.0286) (.0258) (.0265) (.0227) (.0196)
Fractionalization:
linguistic .5018¤ .5055¤¤ .5148¤ .3952¤¤










tropical area (fraction) .3460¤¤ .2865¤¤
(.1330) (.1194)
Number of observations 141 140 140 135 136 136 146
Notes: Economic variables are treated as endogenous variables and instrumented with landlock. All spec-
i¯cations include an exhaustive set of regional dummies for North America and Western Europe, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, and Rest of Asia and Paci¯c. Heteroskedascity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
¤ indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 10% level.
¤¤ indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level.
































Figure 1. Terrorism and Political Freedom
15